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4. Production sharing and Singapore's 
global competitiveness* 
Sven W. Arndt 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Singapore has made spectacular progress in recent decades in pushing its 
economy into the world's top ranks. One important payoff has been a 
substantial rise in living standards. Among the main drivers behind this 
accomplishment have been entrepot trade, which exploits an important 
natural comparative advantage, on the one hand, and enlightened education, 
social, and economic policies, which have built up man-made comparative 
advantage based on human capital, on the other. 
The Singapore economy is highly dependent on international trade, 
especially entrepot trade. The role of entrepot trade is dramatically evident in 
Figure 4.1 where the values of exports and imports each exceed gross 
domestic product (GDP) by a significant margin, and in Figure 4.2, which 
shows the importance of re-exports in total merchandise exports. While 
entrepot trade is likely to be an important part of the Singapore economy for 
some time to come, well-positioned competitors in the region are gearing up 
to challenge the country's dominance. It is important for Singapore not only 
to remain competitive in shipping and transportation, but also to ensure 
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competitiveness in other sectors. Cross-border production networks can play 
a key role in this effort. Singapore also faces competition in world markets 
from both less advanced and more advanced countries. The dominance of 
entrepot trade has allowed labour costs in Singapore to rise toward levels 
occupied by advanced countries, while labour productivity and the quality of 
human capital may not always have kept pace. In the absence of such a 
dominant sector, wage growth would have been more constrained by 
international competition faced by firms in manufacturing and services.1 
When it comes to enhancing competitiveness in other sectors, the 
combination of relatively high wage costs and size and space limitations 
creates special problems for Singapore. Advanced countries in North 
America and Europe try to overcome the scarcity of unskilled labour through 
immigration and guest-worker programmes, but space and congestion 
constraints appear to make this an unsustainable option for Singapore. One 
way to deal with this problem is to jump up the value chain to products and 
services in the production of which unskilled labour is unimportant. Another 
is to 'import' low-cost labour via cross-border production sharing. 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the contribution cross-border 
production sharing can make to productivity and competitiveness in 
Singapore. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 
examines several popular measures of competitiveness and compares them to 
the idea of comparative advantage in order to assess Singapore's 
competitiveness at the sectoral level. Section 3 discusses the effects of cross­
border production sharing on competitiveness and derives implications for 
Singapore. Section 4 offers a summary and some closing comments. An 
annex on the economics of production sharing follows the main text. 
2. COMPETITIVENESS VERSUS COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE 
Although the terms 'comparative advantage' and 'competitiveness' are often 
used synonymously as determinants of a country's trade profile, they are 
conceptually quite different and imply quite differe,nt policy outcomes. 
To be competitive means to be able to sell goods at a profit in world markets. 
Unless a country's firms have price-setting powers in home or foreign 
markets, competitiveness is essentially a matter of controlling costs. Hence, 
an indicator of relative costs would be a useful measure of a country's 
competitiveness. Inasmuch as such measures are unavailable at industry or 
sector levels, analysts use trade performance as a rather imperfect substitute. 
They examine exports and imports in order to see what may be 'revealed' 
about competitiveness. The fact that a country exports a product may be 
taken as a good preliminary indicator of competitiveness. If, in addition, the 
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share of exports of the product in the country's total exports exceeds the 
share of exports of that commodity in world exports, the country must have a 
competitive edge. Symmetrical considerations apply to the products a 
country imports. 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 display Singapore's top three export and import sectors 
in terms of their respective shares in total exports and imports. They are 
electrical equipment, computers and machinery, and lubricants fuel, and oil, 
and together accounted for·roughly two thirds of exports and of imports in 
2000. Among the less dominant sectors, organic chemicals and optical and 
medical instruments provide less than 5 per cent of exports each, while 
instruments and plastics capture less .than 5 per cent of Singapore's goods 
imports each. 
It is striking though not completely unusual that the same sectors dominate 
exports and imports. Such symmetry is typical, for example, of countries 
whose trade is predominantly intra-industry in nature. Specialization 
according to product variety has long been recognized as an important feature 
of intra-industry trade among advanced countries (the so-called 'varieties 
model'). Intra-industry trade is also consistent with the 'Linder hypothesis', 
according to which trade between advanced and developing countries may 
display such a pattern in which the former export goods at the high end of the 
quality spectrum of a sector and import goods at the low end of the spectrum. 
Cross-border production sharing takes specialization beyond intra-indust1y 
trade to intra-product trade. Intra-product trade occurs when production is 
'fragmented' and spread across borders, so that the parts, components and 
accessories (PCAs) contained in a product are manufactured in several 
countries. 
If the varieties model were the dominant explanation for Singapore's trade 
profile, we would expect imports and exports in a given sector or industry to 
consist of products of largely identical quality, but of different variety. If the 
Linder hypothesis dominated, we would expect Singapore's imports from 
emerging economies in a given sector to be of lower quality than its exports 
to those economies. At the same time, Singapore's exports in that sector to 
advanced countries like the United States (US) and Japan would be expected 
to be less technologically sophisticated than imports from those countries. 
Where intra-product trade is important in a sector, Singapore would tend to 
be an importer of labour-intensive and high-tech-intensive components and 
an exporter of middle-range components, in addition to trade in final 
products. 
Thus, if countries like Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines are 
'emerging' market economies and the US, Japan, and other advanced 
countries have 'emerged', then we may think of economies like Singapore 
and Hong Kong as 'emergent'. The composition of an emergent economy's 
trade will be more complex as a result of its position in the middle of the 
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continuum. In trade with countries at the e
merging end of the continu1,1m, 
imports will be more labour-intensive an
d less technology- and skill­
intensive than exports, while trade with co
untries at the emerged end will 
show exports to be more labour-intensive and
 less technology- and skill-
intensive than imports. 
As noted, the products exported by a country are of
ten taken as indicative 
of competitiveness or comparative advantage,
 while those imported are 
interpreted as representing sectors in which
 the country 'lacks' 
competitiveness. In its assessment of competitiveness
, the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) (2002) constructs two types of trade-perf
ormance indices. The 
first index (Cu) measures current trade performance and 
is based on share in 
world exports, value of net exports, per capita export
s, and product and 
market divers ification . The second (Ch) is a measure of per
formance change 
in the recent past and includes changes in world market share
, product 
diversification, market diversification, sectoral trade s
urplus, and 
specialization in the rapidly growing areas of a sector.
2 In Table 4.1, 
measures of Singapore ' s current standing appear in the first colu
mn, and 
those representing recent changes in the second. 
Table 4.1 Singapore's trade performance index 
Product type 
Transport equipment 
Chemicals 
Non-electronical machinery 
IT & consumer electronics 
Electronic components 
Minerals 
Basic manufactures 
Miscellaneous manufactures 
Fresh food 
Processed food 
Wood products 
Clothing 
Textiles 
a. Current standing b. Change index- See text for details 
Source: World Economic Forum (2002) 
cu• Chb 
13 72 
4 2 
18 74 
4 67 
13 52 
10 34 
30 59 
19 100 
19 84 
28 115 
22 63 
39 71 
25 57 
According to the first measure, Singapore ' s current competitiveness ranges 
from chemicals, information technology (IT) and consumer ·electronics, 
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where it is strongest, to clothing, textiles, processed food, and basic 
manufacturing, where it is weakest. In between are sectors like minerals, 
transport equipment, electronic components, non-electrical machinery, 
miscellaneous manufacturing, and a variety of other activities. 
The International Trade Centre of UNCTAD/WTO (UNITC, 2002) 
produces rankings based on revealed comparative advantage (RCA), as 
shown in the first column of Table 4.2. The Centre's (RCA) indices relate the 
share of a product in a country's exports to the share of that commodity in 
world exports. Values in excess of unity indicate country specialization and 
hence 'reveal' comparative advantage. 3 
The common characteristic of these measures is that they make ex post 
inferences about competitiveness. While they are unquestionably 'revealing' 
about competitiveness, they do not say anything directly about cost 
effectiveness or resource productivity. They are, moreover, sensitive to trade 
restrictions, subsidies and competitiveness policies, which help create trade 
patterns which have little to do with comparative advantage. Hence, the fact 
that a commodity receives a 'low' rating in these exercises does not 
necessarily mean that the country is not cost-competitive. Indeed; countries 
will often be net importers of products in which they are cost-competitive. 
Table 4.2 Singapore's specialization index 
Product type Rank 
Consumer electronics 4 
Electronic components 5 
Misc. manufacturing 25 
Non-electric machinery 34 
Chemicals 56 
Transport equipment 58 
Minerals 81 
Clothing 94 
Textiles 99 
Basic manufactur ing 102 
Wood products 112 
Processed food 117 
Fresh food 156 
Source: UN lTC (2002) 
Revealed comparative 
advantage 
2.61 
3.00 
0.94 
0.58 
0.68 
0.13 
0.86 
0.41 
0.25 
0.30 
0.16 
0.41 
0.25 
In thinking about competitiveness and comparative advantage, it is useful 
as a first step to recall the distinction in the trade literature between 'absolute' 
• 
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and 'comparative' advantage, where the former compares costs of p
roduction 
at home and abroad. A country whose costs fall below those o
f another 
would clearly be judged to be competitive by conventional definitions of
 that 
measure. Indeed, it would be judged to be competitive if its costs 
matched 
those of other country suppliers. However, it would not necessarily e
xport the 
product. Absolute advantage is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condit
ion 
for exporting a product. 
It is not a country's raw ability to compete, but its relative or 'comparative' 
ability that matters. The number of products in which a country ha
s 
comparative advantage 'will thus always be smaller than those in which it is 
competitive. A country's ability to compete in the world market for a 
commodity does not imply that it should export that commodity. In fact, it 
will be economically efficient to import some products in which the country 
is competitive, in order to free up productive resources for use in products in 
which it is relatively more competitive. If productive resources are allocated 
across sectors in ways that equalize returns at the margin, there will typically 
be products in which the country is competitive, but which it nevertheless 
produces in limited quantities or not at all and imports instead. Thus, the fact 
that Singapore has a relatively low share of exports in or even imports certain 
products is not necessarily evidence that the country is not competitive in 
those areas. 
3. PRODUCTION SHARING AND COMPETITIVENESS 
3.1 Fragmenting the Production Process 
Cross-border production sharing, also known as cross-border production 
fragmentation or intra-product specialization, has received a major boost 
from recent innovations in communications and transportation technologies 
and from market-opening changes in trade and regulatory policies. As a 
result, the cost of coordinating economic activities across national frontiers 
has declined precipitously in recent years and manufacturers have responded 
by breaking up the production process and moving its constituent activities 
abroad, producing components and locating assembly in accordance with the 
dictates of comparative advantage. 
In this framework, a capital-rich, labour-poor country will have an edge in 
producing components that are capital- and skill-intensive, while labour-rich 
countries will produce the labour-intensive components and undertake 
labour-intensive assembly. This principle, which is well known in 
commodity trade, is now being applied to trade in PCAs. Airliners, 
automobiles, consumer electronics, apparel, and many otber products are 
made up of components that come from every corner of the world.4 
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Many companies utilize cross-border sourcing of components in order to 
increase competitiveness in markets for the final product. If a component can 
be obtained at lower cost from a foreign source, then the cost savings can 
either be passed on in lower end-product prices, hence garnering larger 
market share, or be collected in higher profits at given prices. A country does 
not have to be the producer of an end product in order to reap benefits from 
cross-border production sharing. Indeed, one of the attractive features of 
production sharing is that it facilitates a finer division of labour and thereby 
enables more countries to benefit from participation in global production 
networks. This can be especially valuable for economies trying to move up 
the value chain in international trade. 
High-wage countries tend to be at a competitive disadvantage in labour­
intensive aspects of production. To engage in such activities is to undermine 
overall "'competitiveness. Modem technology enables firms to maintain 
competitiveness by dispersing labour-intensive activities to labour-rich, low­
wage locations. In the absence of cross-border fragmentation, rising wage 
costs would cause domestic firms to lose market share at home and abroad, 
as imports of competing products rise and exports of the home product fall. 
Cross-border sourcing enables firms to slow, if not reverse, that process. 
This advantage of cross-border sourcing is well understood in the North 
American automobile industry, for example, where US carmakers seek to 
enhance competitiveness by relocating labour-intensive assembly to Northern 
Mexico. Production sharing of this type enables both countries to raise 
average productivity and thus to increase employment and wages.5 From 
Mexico's perspective, the lack of competitiveness in capital- and skill­
intensive activities makes production of the entire automobile uneconomic at 
present. By importing skill- and capital-intensive components from the US, 
Mexico enjoys cost advantages which enables its auto industry to compete in 
the US market. Over time, importation of technology, together with 
accumulation of skills, should enable Mexican producers to move up the 
value chain away from labour-intensive assembly. 
3.2 Trade Balance and Exchange Rate Effects 
The rise of components trade has important implications for how we measure 
and interpret the balance of trade. in the presence of cross-border production 
sharing, imports and exports of final products may embody significant 
amounts of exported and imported components, respectively. The 
aforementioned automobiles entering the US from Mexico are so full of US­
made parts that the US value-added exceeds the value that was added in 
Mexico. Analogously, US exports, say, of airliners, contain significant 
amounts of imported components, so that the value of the exported product is 
larger than the US-made value embedded in that product. 
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These developments require new ways of thinkin
g, not only about 
competitiveness, but also about the trade bala
nce. Sin
_
ce goods
_ 
e�tering a 
country contain homemade components and good
s leavmg contam Imported 
components, what does the conventional measure of the
 trade balance tell us? 
If the value of a country's imports exceeds its exports, the traditional
 measure 
asserts that the country was a net importer of value. Howeve
r, if the share of 
homemade components in imports exceeds the foreign componen
ts in exports 
by enough, there will actually have been a net export of valu
e. 
While cross-border production sharing alters the way we view t
he trade 
balance and current account, it also alters the effects of exchan
ge rate 
changes on the trade balance and current account. Depreciation of the h
ome 
currency, for example, raises the domestic currency price of imported
 final 
products and thus makes domestic suppliers of such products more 
competitive. However, if those domestic products contain imported 
components, then the depreciation raises costs, thereby diluting the 
competitive edge created by the depreciation. Analogous considerations hold 
for the country's exports, the competitiveness of which rises with a currency 
depreciation. This advantage is diluted, however, to the extent that exports 
contain imported components, the prices of which rise with the depreciation. 
Further, if the imported products contain components which were imported 
by the country of origin, whose currency has appreciated, then the lower cost 
of components allows foreign firms to reduce the prices of their exports, 
thereby mitigating the anti-competitive effects of the appreciation of their 
currency. The net effect of an exchange rate change depends on a variety of 
factors, including methods of transfer pricing by multinational corporations 
(MNCs), but the basic point remains -cross-border sourcing and production 
sharing reduces the impact of exchange rate movements on competitiveness. 
Hence, traditional ways of thinking about the effects of exchange rate 
changes give the wrong answer in a world in which offshore sourcing and 
cross-border production sharing are important (see Chapter 11 in this volume 
by Rarnkishen Rajan and Reza Siregar for a detailed discussion of 
Singapore's exchange rate policy). 
It is worth pointing out that production sharing may affect the choice of 
trading partner in the formation of preferential trade agreements. 
Traditionally, an important criterion in the choice of partners has been to 
provide markets for exporters, while the emergence of cross-border 
production sharing makes access to imports of low-cost components a key 
element. The traditional approach was mainly an exercise in trade 
liberalization, whereas cross-border production shifts the weight toward 
deeper economic integration. 
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3.3 Components in the Trade of Singapore 
Components play an important role in Singapore's overall trade. Figures 4.5a 
and 4.5b illustrate the case with reference to imports of automatic data 
processing equipment (ADP), parts and accessories. It is clear that imports of 
components make up a substantial share of total imports in that industry. 
Indeed, in its trade with the US, the value of component imports has 
exceeded imports of equipment in recent years. Figures 4.6a and 4.6b repeat 
the exercise on the export side. 
Comparison of Figures 4.5b and 4.6a raises a question to which we do not 
have an answer, but which i� irnportant nevertheless - what is the portion of 
components imported into Singapore in Figure 4.5b that ends up in 
equipment exported in Figure 4.6a? Still mare interesting, and related to 
automobile trade between the US and Mexico, is the (unknown) portion of 
components imported from the US that is incorporated into equipment which 
is then exported to the US. Questions arise as well about the shares of 
components from Japan, Malaysia and Thailand that may be embodied in 
equipment that is exported to the US. We do not have precise answers to 
these questions, but the fact, for example, that a downturn in equipment 
exports to the US is matched by a downturn in component imports suggests 
the possibility of a connection. 
Finally, Figures 4.7a and 4.7b compare Singapore's exports and imports of 
transistors, microcircuits and related parts. As before, the two sides of the 
trade balance trace out very sirnilar patterns, probably as a reflection of the 
global business cycle in the industry. 
An important question from the perspective of competitiveness is, what 
determines whether a microcircuit is exported or imported? The preceding 
discussion suggests that an item should be imported if producing it requires 
inputs that are relatively scarce and expensive in Singapore and exported if 
the opposite condition holds. Another way of expressing the 'rule' is that the 
item should be imported if producing it at home uses up more productive 
resources than the resources needed to make the exports that pay for the 
imported item. This expression links the rule directly to the discussion above 
of competitiveness and comparative advantage. What matters is the 
difference between the resource cost of domestic production and the resource 
cost of the exports involved in the exchange. 
Singapore's position as an 'emergent' economy, however, means that trade 
patterns depend on their direction along the continuum. Hence, in trade with 
Malaysia, Thailand and other emerging economies, we expect imported 
microcircuits to be relatively standardized and labour-intensive and exported 
microcircuits to be relatively more customized and ski ll-, capital- and 
technology-intensive. The exported items should, however, be less skill-, 
capital- and technology-intensive than those imported from the US and 
Japan. 
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Singapore is well positioned to be a leading producer and exporter of 
components whose place along the technology and skill continuum lies 
somewhere between the two component types involved in the first two points 
above. Taken together, these two points suggest that multi-component end 
products from Singapore may contain significant shares of foreign value­
added. This can be a potential problem if Singapore allows itself to be 
squeezed by competition from both ends of the continuum in the direction of 
being an assembler of products which contain labour-intensive components 
imported from emerging economies and skill, capital- and technology­
intensive components imported from emerged economies. At given world 
product prices, rising shares of imported components reduce the space for 
domestic value added. 
( 
3.4 Production Sharing and Factor Flows 
While offshore sourcing enables firms to defend their competitiveness, it has 
broader implications for society at large. It may, for example, provide an 
alternative to cross-border labour migration. As unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour has become scarce and expensive in industrialized countries, 
immigration has often provided a solution. In Europe, large-scale guest­
worker migrations have played an important role over the years and in 
Canada and the United States immigration continues to supply labour. 
Offshore sourcing and cross-border production offer an alternative, 
especially where labour immigration is not a viable option for reasons of 
crowding and congestion. In such cases, relocation of labour-intensive 
production to labour-abundant countries provides a way of importing the 
services of workers without worker migration. This option applies not only to 
manufacturing, but also to services, such as airline reservation centres, which 
do not depend on the physical presence of workers in the country that uses 
their services. There exist many other types of services, however, including 
domestic, hotel and sanitation services, which do require the physical 
presence of the labourer. 
While production sharing with a labour-abundant country reduces the need 
for inflows of labour, it often gives rise to outflows of capital to finance 
construction of production facilities. Additional host country investment is 
often needed in order to provide essential infrastructure. While private 
foreign direct investment plays a key role in setting up productive capacity 
and host governments may provide infrastructure and tax and other 
incentives, the role, if any, of the investing country's government is more 
problematic. Ireland is an interesting case in which government provided 
significant incentives and the European Union funds helped upgrade the 
infrastructure. 
The basic issue is whether investing-country governments should play a 
role beyond ensuring appropriate trade, competition, and related policies. If 
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the government becomes an investment partner in the enterprise, for 
example, does it expose public resources to undue risk? Such questions are 
particularly relevant to the situation in Singapore, where public and quasi­
public entities play more prominent roles than in many other countries. These 
and related issues are taken up in later chapters of this volume. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As an 'emergent' economy; Singapore finds itself challenged by emerging 
economies, on the one hand, and by emerged economies, on the other. Even 
its prized position as an entrepot trader is not exempt from challenges, as 
neighbouring countries upgrade their ability to compete. 
Among the new elements in international competition are production 
fragmentation and cross-border production sharing, made possible by trade 
liberalization and by cost-cutting innovations in communication and 
transportation technologies. Cross-border production sharing enables 
countries to participate in the making of a product, without having to produce 
all of it. If each country focuses on what it does best, all participants benefit. 
In this environment, countries need to think not only about improved access 
to markets in which to sell goods, but about markets in which to obtain 
inputs. 
Components trade is already an important activity in Singapore, with 
significant shares in both exports and imports. As an 'emergent' economy, 
Singapore faces competition from both emerging and advanced economies. 
In trade with emerging countries, Singapore has an edge in exporting 
relatively skill-, technology-, and capital-intensive parts, components and 
accessories (PCAs), while importing the more labour-intensive varieties. In 
trade with advanced countries, the ordering is reversed, with imported 
components being relatively skill-, technology-, and capital-intensive. 
Emergent economies like Singapore face competition from both sides of 
the spectrum of trading partners and thus risk being squeezed in terms of 
value-added shares in exported end products. When products become 
internationalized through cross-border production networks, a country's 
share of the value added contained in such products is an indicator of sectoral 
or industry-specific competitiveness. As Singapore is forced to cede 
production of labour-intensive components to emerging economies, it must 
strive to wrest production of skill-, technology- and capital-intensive 
components from advanced economies. In other words, it must move up the 
value chain of component production. Failure to do so will cause Singapore's 
value-added share to decline, and that will be an indicator of declining 
competitiveness. 
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ANNEX: THE ECONOMICS OF PRODUCTION SHARING 
If a product must be produced in its entirety in a single location, then a 
company's or an industry's competitiveness is a weighted average of 
competitiveness in the various component activities. Companies learned long 
ago that outsourcing of parts, components and accessories (PCAs) can play 
an important role in controlling costs and safeguarding competitiveness. 
Until recently, however, the cost of outsourcing increased substantially when 
national frontiers had to be crossed. As trade barriers have come down and 
satellite communications and other technological innovations have reduced 
coordination costs, it has become' easier to spread the constituent activities of 
production across countries. If a company wishing to compete in a given 
product market is better than anybody at making every part of the product, 
then it should make the product in its entirety. However, if the company's 
cost competitiveness varies across constituent activities, then the company 
can improve its overall competitiveness by outsourcing activities in which 
competitiveness is weak. 
Analytically, the effect of outsourcing is similar to that of technical 
progress. Technical progress Jowers cost by raising the productivity of capital 
or labour or both. As a result, the production possibility curve shifts out, in 
all directions if technical progress occurs everywhere in the economy, or only 
in the direction marking the industry or sector in which it takes place. For 
small countries that face given world commodity prices, this implies a rise in 
the output of that industry and an increase of employment there. 
When a country ceases to produce a component in which it has a 
comparative disadvantage, the quantity of resources it must give up by 
importing the component declines relative to the quantity of resources needed 
to produce the component at home. This is equivalent to the resource-cost­
reducing effect of technical progress. Here, too, the production possibility 
curve shifts out, in just one dimension if just one sector resorts to outsourcing 
or in multiple dimensions if many sectors engage in cross-border sourcing. 
And, as before, in the small, price-taking country output and employment rise 
in the relevant sector(s). 
This result is important, because it undercuts a key claim of the 
protectionists, which is that outsourcing causes industry output and 
employment to shrink. The intuition behind this outcome is simple: if 
outsourcing reduces costs and makes an industry's product more competitive 
in home and foreign markets, then domestic firms will be able to sell more of 
that product than before. Hence, although jobs making the abandoned 
component are lost, jobs are opened up in making the other components and 
in assembling the larger quantity of the final product. 
The specifics of the adjustment depend on a variety of factors and 
conditions, but the basic intuition stands. It is the element that makes 
production sharing a win-win arrangement for the countries that participate in 
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it. Under production sharing, labour-rich countries specialize in labour­
intensive PCAs, while skill-, technology-, and capital-intensive countries 
specialize in a complementary fashion. The shift toward production sharing 
bas effects in the relevant industries on both sides analogous to technical 
progress, raising output and employment. Factor rewards also rise, although 
the effect on factor-price ratios depends on the factor intensity of the sectors 
involved in cross-border production sharing. 
NOTES 
1. This situation contains some of the elements of the age-old Dutch disease phenomenon. 
2. See WEF (2002, pp.\26-127) for details. For a critical assessment of the methodological 
approach involved, see Chapter 3 in this volume by Sanjaya Lall. 
3. Tamamura (2002) provides a detailed assessment of industrial structure, competitiveness and 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in the Asian region. 
4. See the annex for additional comments. For detailed analyses, see Arndt (1997, 1998, 2001), 
Deardorff (200 I), and Jones and Kierzkowski (200 I). For an application of production sharing 
to economic development, see Arndt (1999). 
5. See the annex and Arndt (1998). For an application to U.S.-Mexico trade, see Arndt and 
Huemer (200 I, 2002). 
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